I. Introduction
The object of this paper is to develop an early warning system (EWS) of a country's macroeconomic fragility. The idea is to have an instrument that helps policymakers identify and anticipate situations in which crises are more likely to happen, in the vein of the leading indicators literature. Previous work has already been done in this area, mainly by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997), and Kaminsky (1998). There are three main differences between our paper and previous ones upon which it is based:
a) The main interest is to have an operational tool . The ultimate objective is to build the simplest possible EWS to be updated monthly at the lowest feasible cost. Data i Paper presented in the XVII Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, in Cancun, August, 1999. We thank Sara Calvo, Norman Loayza, Guillermo Perry, and Carmen Reinhart for insightful comments. b) The aggregation method of the individual leading indicators into a composite inceex; and the way this index is used as a signaling device. Kaminsky (1998) construcls a composite index by aggregating signals of the different indicators. We take a diffeient approach in aggregating the variables and then generating the signals depending on the behavior of the composite index. The reason for adopting this strategy is that we beli -eve that for a crisis to take place the set of leading indicators must jointly drift in the sa.mrte direction over some period of time.
c) The exclusive focus on LAC countries, estimating the models and showing details on a country by country basis that other papers do not present due to the large number of countries in their pane] s.
With this in mind, the paper has four sections besides this introduction: the first one identifies crises periods, or periods of unusual market volatility, based on monithly information for the period from 1980 to June,1998. The second section presents the leading indicators and the aggregation procedures that will allow identifying regularii:ics in pre-crisis periods We build four different signal-generating mechanisms, three of which have previously been used and a fourth one that is novel in this paper. The tLird chapter evaluates the alternative filtering mechanisms for each country. showing tlhat, even though different criteria lead to different model selection outcomes, the new methtod proposed in this paper leads to the minimum Type I error. The recent crisis in BraziL, Ecuador and Colombia are used to test the out of sample predictive ability of the mdcl with good results. The fourth and last section summarizes the results, stressing the usefulness of these types of leading indicators methodology but it also points out its rri ain limitations.
II. Periods of Unusual Market Volatility
This section seeks to determine the "crises" periods, in order to study the behavior of :)ur leading indicators prior to their occurrence. In line with most of the literature on l his topic, we define an Index of Speculative Pressure (ISP) as follows: 3 variables, but Eichengreen's sensitivity analysis to different weighting patterns indicate there should be no major changes expected.
A crisis is defined as a period in which ISP t > u + 1.5a (where u is the sample mean and cr the standard deviation of the ISP). Table 1 summarizes the dates when the ISP surpasses the threshold. For countries experiencing hyperinflation (Argentina, Brazil and Peru), different thresholds were calculated both for these episodes and for more stable periods 6 . A total of 64 crises result and will be used in the analysis. Once the composite index of macroeconomic vulnerability (IMV) is built, its sinmple evolution is not informative enough about a potential risk situation. Thresholds have., to be used in assessing when the IMV has reached an "anomalous" level.
We applied four transformations or filters to the IMV to generate signals: detrending the variable with respect to its long-run level (defined as the Hodrick-Prescott trend), the variable in levels (no iFilter), detrending the variable with respect to a short-run (6 mos.) moving average and thLe residuals of an ARIMA model fitted to the IMV. The first three (or variants) have been used in other papers while the ARIMA residuals approach is novel, and produced the lowest Type I error (probability of not anticipating the crisis).
Initially we focus on the IMV as described above, to make our sample period as comparable as possible to that of other papers. In a second stage stock market prices in real terms are included as an additional leading variable, but the sample period is shortened to 1986-199,8 due to availability of consistent information from the IFC on this variable for most of the sample countries.
A. Deviations from trend model (DT model)
This model uses deviations from a long run trend to generate signals. To determine wriat the long run trend of a series is, the IMF used a 3-year moving average, but we prefer-ed the Hodrick-Prescott filter since the first procedure induces autocorrelation to he detrended series. This is an undesirable feature since once the mechanism sends a sigi a;, it will tend to produce signals in successive periods. On the other hand, the HodrilkPrescott filter induces spurious cycle behavior when applied to non-stationary data so we have to be aware of this phenomenon induced by the detrending procedure.
The deviations from the trend for each of the variables were standardized and aggregaled to build the Index of M/Iacro Vulnerability (IMV). The index was computed alternatively, including inflation or not, and based on simple Granger causality tests between thl, se indexes and the crises with lags up to 24months, the best index was chosen. Inflation was an informative variable only in the cases of Argentina and Mexico. This IMV signal i a crisis when it surpasses a threshold determined by the mean plus 1.5 standard deviatiors.
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A characteristic of all the computed IMVs is that their volatilities change through time.
Most of the indexes were particularly volatile from the mid eighties until the early nineties, so the standard deviations that were used were computed from the conditional variance of the series estimated by a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model 9 . The feature of these types of models is that the variance of the IMV is taken to be an ARMA process that is estimated simultaneously with the mean of the series. The GARCH (p,q) model that was used for all the countries wasi°:
IMVt= ao+aiIMVti+et et= vt h v is white noise with I-=1
With the conditional standard deviations, the threshold was computed and the signaling device is complete.
B. The levels model (simple model)
An implicit assumption in the previous model is that temporary departures of variables from their trend provide information regarding future crises but the trend itself is not an informative variable about the macroeconomic vulnerability of a country. Because this might imply discarding useful information we computed the IMV index with the variables in levels. In this case, inflation was an informative variable in all cases, except for Chile and Colombia
The thresholds for the IMV were constructed with the conditional standard deviations of GARCHI models for each country's IMV 12 , and the signaling mechanism is ready. The signal is flashed if the IMV exceeds the mean plus 1.5 standard deviations.
9 Developed by Engle, R. (1982) "Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with estimates of the variance of United Kingdom inflation", Econometrica, 50, 987-1007 and Bollerslev, T. "Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity", Journal of Econometrics, 31, 307-327. '° The order of p and q varied with each country as follows: Argentina 6,1; Brazil 3,1; Chile 6,1; Colombia 3,0; Ecuador 6,0; Mexico 3,1; Peru 1,1; Venezuela 3,0. " The IMV was computed as the sum of standardized variables (without detrending) including inflation or not, and simple Granger causality tests were used to decide which was the best index for each country. 12 The procedure is identical to that described in the DT model. In most cases the whole sample period was split into sub-samples implying different models. The sub-samples and the orders of p and q are: The previous approach may be subject to criticism on the grounds that, since there are several break-points in the sample that are known to the researcher ex-post, it is diffic.ult from an operational viLewpoint to know at every point in time if there has been a change in the mean or variance models. To avoid this problem, a simple approach coimcmnly used by financial markets practitioners is to compare the variable (IMV) with its mo),irng average. Based on Granger causality tests, the 6-month moving average was selected. A signal is flashed when the IMV exceeds the 6-month moving average.
D. The ARIMA residuals model
Finally, one could hypothesize that a crisis is more likely to happen when the set of leading indicators are behaving "strangely". The "normal" or regular behavio: is described by an ARIMA model for the IMV, so the residuals summarize the deviations from the "normal" behavior. In theory, the residuals must be a white noise process and have mean zero. But some residuals will randomly be positive. We're interested in mrore permanent positive deviations, so we constructed a moving average of the residuals and a signal was generated when this statistic exceeds zero. Conceptually, this filter is similar to applying any detrending methodology, except that it considers a richer set of information besides the trend in the variable's history.
IV. Evaluation Criteria and Results
With the four models described above (deviations from trend, simple, chartist and ARIMA residuals) different signals were generated. With their empirical clistributions, as well as those of the crises, we evaluated the models using a 24-month window prior to each crisis 13 . Contemporaneous signals were not counted because they are not ':ad signals and they are not leading variables either. Similarly if a crisis occurs withi l4 months of another one, they are counted as one episode.
A. Evaluation criteria
Our evaluation of each model is based on four 4 statistics; the sizes of Type I and Typt II errors, the noise to signal ratio, and the probability that a crisis occurs given that a sigiial was produced. A short description of each one and details on the computation follow:
We borrow a very useful table from Kaminsky-Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) (1997) to visualize the different criteria: For every non-crisis period, the signals in the 24 month period prior to the each crisis are counted and expressed as a ratio of the sum of the no signal-no crises (good signals) and the signal-no crisis (false signal), given that no crisis occurred.
Since both types of errors are undesirable, a criterion that we will use is to select the model that minimizes the sum of both. An alternative rule will be to choose the model that minimizes Type I error, given that it can be argued that it is more costly not anticipating the extreme risk situations.
The Noise/Signal ratio (NSR)
The Noise/Signal ratio (NSR) measures the false signals (size of Type II error) as a ratio of the good signals issued (1-size of Type I error)
The selection rule is to pick the model that minimizes the NSR for each country. This was the criterion followed by Kaminsky and KLR in their ranking of the different variables.
Probability of a crisis given that a signal was issued P(C/S)
Given that models generate different signals, an alternative criterion is to select the model that maximizes the probability of a crisis occurring given that a signal was issued.
B. Results
The four models (deviations from trend, the simple, chartist and ARIMA residuals) were used for each of the 8 countries. For each model the Type I and II errors, the Noise to Signal Ratio (NSR), and the Probability of having a crisis given that a signal is issued (P(C/S)) were computed, and the results are summarized in Table 3 . Unconditional probabilities of crises occurrence are also presented for each country, to allow gauriing the effectiveness of the models ( In general we observe (Table 3) high Type I errors and low Type II errors. However, compared to Kaminsky's and KLR's results (for individual variables)' 4 , the first are lower and the second higher. The NSR is lower here, and the P(C/S) is very high, especially when compared to the unconditional probability. Table 4 presents the selection of the best model for each of the countries according to the 4 criteria: minimizing the sum of the Type I and II errors, minimizing Type I error, minimizing the NSR and maximizing P(C/S). In most of the cases, the simple model performs the best, except in Argentina where the deviations from trend model outperforms the rest, and Brazil where the chartist model is selected. In Ecuador, the chartist model is preferred because of the low Type I error. The first option implies changing the definition of crisis by setting a higher threshold for the Index of Speculative Pressure (ISP): instead of working with the mean plus 1.5 standard deviations we'll work with 3 standard deviations. And in order to have more signals sent we can lower the threshold for the IMV: instead of working with the mean plus 1.5 standard deviations we'll work with one standard deviation.
We followed this approach with the largest economies Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and obtained significant improvement with respect to the models shown in Table 4 Regarding the anticipation of crises, the selected models do fairly well signaling in advance the extreme risk situations. However there are big differences across countries in the distribution of the signals within the 24-month period prior to the crisis (Table 6 ). In Brazil, Chile and Peru the signals are evenly distributed, with half the signals taking place in the 12 months prior to the crisis. The least anticipation is registered in Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela, where close to 50% of the signals took place within 6 months of the crisis. The most delayed response happens in Argentina, where in the year prior to the crisis only 40% of the signals are issued.
=.~~~~ro toC a=rii Arenin 1.- In the previous section we saw how the best models were, in general, the ARIMA residuals model and the simple one. In this section we'll add the stock market price index in real terms to the list of leading indicators. Our modified IMV is IMVEQ(including equity prices) defined as:
IMVEQ= REER + DCG + M2/R + ;z-+ EQ Where EQ = stock market price in local currency deflated by the CPI.
The cost of introducing this variable is loosing valuable information from the early eighties, since our source of consistent information for most countries (IFC) reports it since 198615.
We conclude that stock market prices are an informative variable of vulnerability based on two tests. First, simple Granger causality tests of the IMV with stock market prices (labeled IMVEQ) and without them and the Index of Speculative Pressure (ISP), point at the value of the information content of stock prices. And second, the comparison between the four alternative models (DT, Simple, Chartist and Residuals) with and without stock market prices (resulting in a total of 8 models) shows that including stock market prices is a superior strategy than the alternative (Appendix 1 shows the four statistics for each model). Table 7 summarizes the model selection information; recall the unconditional probabilities of crisis during this sample period (Table 3A) to see the gains in using these models. The signal distribution in the 24-month window prior to the crisis (Table 8) shows that the timing signal-crisis does not change significantly when stock prices are included and the sample period is shortened. Three crises (Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia) have taken place in our group of countries since we finished the first draft of our paper (July,1998) . In this section we show how :he models predicted the vulnerabilities in each of them. Additionally, we'll see how ilhis methodology would have predicted the Tequila crisis. The methodology is based o:l estimating an ARIMA model for the IMVEQ, using a five year rolling sample, ; nd beginning two years prior to each crisis. A signal will be generated in each of the 24 months of the window prior to the crisis.
In the case of the Brazilian crisis (Jan/99), we estimated an ARIMA model for Ihhe IMVEQ beginning in January 97, with monthly information since Jan 92. For Febru:Lrv 97, the same procedure is repeated with information since February 92, and so on. 1 he signal is flashed when the six-month moving average exceeds zero. Graph I summariz es the evolution of the leading indicator derived from the Arima-residuals model, show:ing that 10 signals were issued in the 24-month window prior to the crisis. Graph 2 is -he leading indicator derived from the chartist model, showing that 13 signals were issuLe(d prior to the crisis.
Exactly the same procedure was followed to study the crisis that took place in Ecuador in February,1999. 
V. Conclusions and Agenda for Future Developments of this Project
The Early Warning System models presented for the group of Latin American countrie s do a good job in anticip.ating vulnerability to crises. The limited set of variables clear' y indicate periods when crises are more likely to happen. However, Type I and II errors aie still high, though smaller than previous papers have found This can be because tie models need improvenment or simply because crisis are events that are inherently unpredictable. At this point, with the tools we used it's impossible to tell. We' [e inclined to believe it's more the first reason. Therefore, a mechanical application of tl e signals issued by these models can lead to a false sense of security or to unwarranted nervousness at some poinits. The country analyst's criteria is in no moment substituted by these tools.
Several modifications are in line within this project. Among the most important is thie inclusion of external interest rates. We begun this work and this variable seems more important for some countries (Mexico) than for others. Including the price of certain commodities, like oil for Venezuela and Ecuador should also improve results. Similarly, incorporating information on the state of the real sector is crucial. We have begun this work with excellent results for most countries (Appendix Tables 2 and 3 
